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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

AMAX MAGNESIUM CORPORATION,
Petitioner/Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No, 88-0251
Priority 14a

THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Respondent/Defendant.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
UTAH MINING ASSOCIATION
ON APPEAL FROM THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

Pursuant to permission granted by order of this Court
on July 5, 1989, the Utah Mining Association ("Association") submits

this

Commission's

brief
Final

as

Amicus

Decision

Curiae
that

in

Amax

support
Magnesium

of

the

Tax

Corporation

("Amax") should be assessed as a mine, but in support of Amax's
position that it is nonetheless entitled to the same 20% reduction

in

the valuation

of

its state-assessed

extended to county-assessed property.

-1-

property

that

is

JURISDICTION
T h i s Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n of
Utah

Code

Ann.

S

this

7 8 - 2 - 2 ( 3 ) ( e ) ( i i ) (1988) ,

S 59-1-602(3)(1987)(a

now r e p e a l e d p a r t

of

a c t i o n pursuant
Utah

Code

t h e Tax Court

to

Ann.
Act1),

and Rule 14 of t h e r u l e s of t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t .
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Does
Amax's

the

Utah

t a x a b l e mining

state-assessed

property

railroad

m e r c i a l and i n d u s t r i a l

State

Tax
at

property,

Commission's

a rate
or o t h e r

assessment

20% h i g h e r

than

other

county-assessed

real property v i o l a t e the equal

of

com-

protection

and due p r o c e s s components of A r t i c l e X I I I , s e c t i o n 3 and A r t i c l e
I,

section

24 of

t h e Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n

and t h e due p r o c e s s
2
e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e s of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n ?

and

1

Section 59-1-602(3) (1987) of the Tax Court Act gave the taxpayer the
option of appealing the Tax Commission's Final Decision to the d i s t r i c t court
for an "original, independent and de novo" t r i a l under section 59-1-603(1) or
to this Court under section 59-1-602(3) for appellate review upon writ of certiorari • Amax exercised the latter option* Docketing Statement at Appendix
3.
2

This brief summarizes and comments upon arguments the parties have already
made with respect to other issues, most notably the definition of "appurtenant f " in order to reach the constitutional issues the parties did not
discuss.
-2-

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Article

XIIIf

section

3(1) of

the Utah

Constitution

provides in pertinent part:
The Legislature shall provide by law a
uniform and equal rate of assessment on all
tangible property in the state, according to
its value in money, except as otherwise
provided in Section 2 of this Article. The
Legislature shall prescribe by law such
provisions as shall secure a just valuation
for taxation of such property, so that every
person and corporation shall pay a tax in
proportion to the value of hisf her or its
tangible property. . . .
Article I, section 24 provides:
All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.
The "due process" and "equal protection" clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provide in
pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-3 (1986) provides in pertinent part:
[A]ll
. . . mines and mining claims and
other valuable deposits, including
nonmetalliferous minerals underlying land the
surface of which is owned by a person other
than the owner of such minerals, all machinery used in mining and all property or

-3-

surface improvements upon or appurtenant to
mines or mining claims . . . must be assessed
by the state tax commission . . . .
All
taxable property not required by the Constitution or by the law to be assessed by the
state tax commission must be assessed by the
county assessor of the several counties in
which the same is situated. For the purposes
of taxation, all mills, reduction works, and
smelters used exclusively for the purpose of
reducing or smelting the ores from a mine or
mining claim by the owner thereof shall be
deemed to be appurtenant to such mine or
mining claim though the same is not upon such
mine or mining claim.
Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5(1) (Supp. 1986) provides in pertinent
part:
When the county asses[s]or uses the comparable sales or cost appraisal method in valuing
taxable property for assessment purposes, the
assessor
is required to recognize that
various fees, services, closing costs, and
other expenses related to the transaction
lessen the actual amount that may be received
in the transaction.
The county assessor
shall, therefore, take 80% of the value based
on comparable sales or cost appraisal of the
property as its reasonable fair cash value
for purposes of assessment.3
49 U.S.C. S 11503(b)(1) provides:
(b) the following acts unreasonably
burden and discriminate against interstate
commerce, and a state, subdivision of a
state, or authority acting for a state or
subdivision of a state may not do any of
them:

3

A revised version of section 59-5-4.5 was enacted in 1987 and is codified
at Utah Code Ann. §59-2-304 (Supp. 1989).
-4-

(1)
assess
rail
transportation
p r o p e r t y a t a v a l u e t h a t has a h i g h e r r a t i o
t o t h e t r u e market v a l u e of t h e r e a l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n p r o p e r t y than t h e r a t i o t h a t t h e
assessed
value
of
other
commercial
and
i n d u s t r i a l p r o p e r t y in t h e same a s s e s s m e n t
j u r i s d i c t i o n has t o t h e t r u e market v a l u e of
the
other
commercial
and
industrial
4
property.
The

entire

texts

of

the

provisions

above a r e reproduced in Appendix A t o t h i s

partially

quoted

brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of

Proceedings

The Mining A s s o c i a t i o n a g r e e s w i t h Amax's S t a t e m e n t
the

Case,

Court's

but

reproduces

here

an

abbreviated

version

for

of
the

convenience.
By t h i s a p p e a l , Amax s e e k s r e v i e w of t h e Utah S t a t e Tax

Commission's

("Tax

Commission")

Final

Decision

determining

1986 a s s e s s e d v a l u e of Amax's r e a l and p e r s o n a l p r o p e r t y
in T o o e l e County,

Utah.

The Tax Commission o r i g i n a l l y

4

the

located
assessed

The wording and structure of section 306 of the Railroad Revitalization
and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (the "4R Act"), Pub.L. No. 94-210, S 306, 90
Stat. 31, 33 (1976) were changed when the section was recodified as part of
the revised Interstate Commerce Act. See Act of October 17, 1978, Pub.L No.
95-473, S 11503, 92 Stat. 1337, 1445-46. The language quoted above i s as i t
appears in the current law, 49 U.S.C. S 11503. The United States D i s t r i c t
Court in Union Pacific Railroad Company, et a l . v. State Tax Conmission of
Utah, et a l . No. C-82-0998J, s l i p op. (D. Utah Dec. 19, 1988) at 3, quoted a
s l i g h t l y different version in effect before 1978.
The 1978 recodification
"was not meant to change the substantive law." Id.
-5-

the

value

of

$84,332,150.

Amax's

property

as

of

January

1,

1986

at

After an informal hearing held on August 25, 1986,

the Tax Commission reduced the assessed value of Amax's property
to $78,312,895.
formal hearing
property.

The Tax Commission thereafter held a plenary
to determine

the fair market

value of

On December 21, 1987, the Tax Commission

Final Decision

further reducing

Amax's

issued a

the assessed value of Amax's

property by approximately $6,000,000, based upon the Commission's
finding that dike maintenance should have been expensed rather
than included as a capital investment.

See Findings of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Final Decision, Docketing Statement at
Appendix 2.

The Tax Commission confirmed all other aspects of

the Property Tax Division's assessment.

Jjd.

Amax thereafter

filed a Petition for Reconsideration, which the Tax Commission
denied by order dated May 31, 1988.
Appendix 1.

See Docketing Statement at

Amax then filed a Petition for Review with this

Court on June 29, 1988. Id. at Appendix 3.
2.

Statement of Facts

The Tax Commission, after using comparable sales and
cost approaches to assessing taxable value (Tr. 151-152, 155-156)
and making the adjustments summarized above, set the "reasonable
fair cash value" of Amax's property as of January 1, 1986 .at
$78,312,895.

In setting this "reasonable fair cash value," the
-6-

Tax Commission declined to value Amax's property pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5
"take 80% of

(1986), which requires county assessors to

the value

[of county-assessed property] based on

comparable sales of cost or cost appraisal of the property as its
reasonable fair cash value for assessment."

The Tax Commission

concluded that section 59-5-4.5 "does not apply to property which
is centrally assessed such as the subject property."
Fact,

Conclusions

of

Law

and

Final

Decision

at

Findings of
paragraph

1.

Likewise, the Tax Commission concluded that its failure to extend
the 20% reduction to state-assessed property was not unconstitutional

because

this

Court

upheld

section

59-5-4.5

against

a

facial constitutional challenge in Rio Alqom v. San Juan County,
681 P-2d 184 (Utah 1984).

Ld.

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

Mining

Association

recognizes

this

Court

will

ordinarily not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if
5
the issues can be resolved by statutory interpretation.
Yet in
this case, this Court must decide the constitutional issues Amax
raises because the Tax Commission was correct in concluding, as a

*
See, e.g., Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197f 201 (Utah 1981) in which this
Court declined to pass upon a constitutional question (statutory preference
for maternal custody) when the case could be decided upon another basis (best
interest of the child).

-7-

matter of statutory interpretation, that Amaxfs plant is "appurtenant" to a mine and, thus, subject to state-assessment,
Amax argues it should receive a 20% reduction in the
assessed value of its taxable property for two reasons:
that Amax's plant

and ponds are not

first,

"appurtenant" to a mine

within the meaning of section 59-5-3 and, that, therefore, its
property should be county-assessed rather that state-assessed;
second, and in the alternative, if Amax's plant and ponds are
"appurtenant" to the mine (i.e. the Great Salt Lake), the 20%
reduction

in

section

59-5-4.5,

by

its

terms

limited

to

county-assessed property, is unconstitutional under Article XIII,
section 3 of the Utah Constitution.
The Tax Commission correctly concluded that "for 1986,
[Amax's] subject property is appurtenant to the mine, i.e., the
Great Salt Lake ponds from which the minerals were extractedt,3"
for four reasons.
First, the usually accepted meaning of "appurtenant,"
which deems an appendage to be an "appurtenance" to the extent it
passes with the property when title transfers, cannot apply to
Amax's plant because the "mine," or the Great Salt Lake, is not
subject to taxation as property.

-8-

Second, the cases Amax cites in support of its narrow
definition of "appurtenant" involve facts significantly dissimilar to those of this case.
Third,

a

common

sense

application

of

the

rules

of

statutory construction leads to the conclusion that Amax's plant
should be "deemed" appurtenant to the mine.
And

fourth,

mine, because
lake, ponds

the Amax

it "belongs

and plant

plant

is

to" the mine

functioned

"appurtenant"
in the sense

as a complete

to

the

that

the

unit.

Hence,

Amaxfs property was properly classified as state-assessed, rather
than county-assessed, property.
Nonetheless, the Tax Commission's failure to extend the
same

20% discount

available

section

59-5-4.5

to Amax's

federal

constitutional

to county-assessed
property

guarantees

property

violates Amax's
to

due

process

under

state and
and

equal

protection of the law.
Amax
Commission's
section

3 of

demonstrates

assessment
the

Utah

of

in

its

brief

that

the

Tax

its property violates Article XIII,

Constitution

because

(1)

the

evidence

before the Tax Commission demonstrated that failure to extend the
20% discount to Amax's property widened rather than narrowed the
disparity

between

state-assessed

and

county-assessed

property;

and (2) as a result of the federal district court ruling in Union

-9-

Pacific

v.

Utah

State

Tax

Commission,

railroads,

which

are

state-assessed property like mines, have received the benefit of
the 20% discount, although mines have not.
In addition, the Tax Commission's refusal to apply the
20% discount in calculating the "Reasonable Fair Cash Value" of
Amax's property violates the due process and equal protection
guarantees of the state and federal constitutions.
From 1984 onward, the Tax Commission's overvaluation of
mines, as compared to railroads, (resulting from Union Pacific)
denies Amax and other mine owners the equal protection of the
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

This

conclusion

is supported

by

the

United

States

Supreme Court's recent decision in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co.
v. County Commissioner of Webster County, which held that "The
relative

undervaluation

of

comparable

property

.

.

. over

time . . . denies . . . the equal protection of law."
For similar reasons and using similar analyses, the Tax
Commission's overvaluation of state-assessed mines as compared to
state-assessed
protection

railroads

components

violates

of Article

Constitution.

-10-

the

due

process

1, section

24 of

and

equal

the Utah

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TAX COMMISSION CORRECTLY HELD THAT AMAX'S
PROPERTY
SHOULD
BE
STATE-ASSESSED,
NOT
COUNTY-ASSESSED, BECAUSE IT IS "APPURTENANT"
TO A MINE WITHIN THE MEANING OF UTAH CODE
ANN. S 59-5-3 (1986),
Section

Tax Commission

59-5-3 provides,

shall

mining property.

in pertinent

assess all mines, mining

part,

that

the

claims, and all

Section 59-5-3 continues to state that "For the

purposes of taxation, all minerals, reduction works and smelters
used exclusively for the purpose of reducing or smelting the ores
from a mine or mining claim by the owner thereof, shall be deemed
to be appurtenant

to the mine or such mining claim, though the

same

the mine

is not

upon

or such mining

claim."

(Emphasis

added.)
Amax

and

the Tax

Commission

agree

that

plant nor the pond is a "mine" or a "mining claim."
also

agree to the obvious

fact

that

the plant

neither

the

The parties

is not

located

"upon" the Great Salt Lake or on the ponds, and is instead built
on

a separate

parcel

of

critically,

the parties

"mine"

"mining

nor

land

which

Amax

owns

in fee.

agree that the plant, while

claim,"

can

6

be

state-assessed

Most

neither a
if

it

is

Utah Code Ann. § 59-3-1(8) (1986) defines a "mine" as "a natural deposit
of . . . valuable mineral." "Mining claim" is not statutorily defined.
-11-

"appurtenant"

to a mine.

See Brief

of Petitioner

at

17, and

Brief of Respondent at 7.
The parties

then devote

the

their respective briefs to arguing
nant."

entire

first

section of

the definition of "appurte-

Amax claims that "appurtenant" must be interpreted and

applied so as to mean "something that has been added or appended
to

a property

usually

and

becomes

an

inherent

part

of

the

property;

[passing] with the property when title is transferred."

Brief of Petitioner at 18 and 19.

The Tax Commission argues that

"appurtenant"

as

should

be

defined

"within the same proximity."

"adjacent,"

"adjunct,"

or

Brief of Respondent at 8.

The Mining Association concludes the Tax Commission's
interpretation

of

"appurtenant"

as used

in section

59-5-3

is

correct for four reasons.
First, the usually accepted meaning of

"appurtenant,"

which deems an appendage to be an "appurtenance" to the extent it
passes with the property when title it transferred, cannot apply
to Amax's plant or ponds because the "mine," or the Great Salt
Lake,

is not subject

explained

in

Morton

to taxation

as property.

International,

Inc.

v.

As this Court
Southern

Transportation Company, 495 P.2d 31, 32 (Utah 1972):
"Because it [the Great Salt Lake] is a
navigable body of water, its bed belongs to
the state subject to the control of Congress
for navigation in commerce. . . .
It is our
opinion that the state as the owner of the
-12-

Pacific

beds of navigable bodies of water is entitled
to all valuable minerals in or on them," such conclusion being affirmed and established by the U.S. Supreme Court in the most
recent decision of June 6, 1971. 7
The significance

of Utah's ownership of all valuable

minerals in or on the Great Salt Lake is that Amax has only "a
non-exclusive

right

to

extract

and process" magnesium

in

the

brine of the lake waters sold to it by the state on a royalty
basis.

See

Utah

Code

Ann.

S 65-1-15(3)

(1986),

now

65A-6-1

(1988).

If Amax's plant is not "appurtenant" to the mine, which

by definition includes the Great Salt Lake as a "natural deposit
of valuable mineral," Amax's property will not be state-assessed
even though Amax appears to concede it engages in "mining," that
is, "the process of producing, extracting, leaching, evaporation,
or otherwise

removing a mineral from a mine."

S

(1986). 8

59-3-1(8)

There

is

no

Utah Code Ann.

evidence

the

legislature

intended such an anomalous result.
Second, the cases Amax cites in support of its narrow
definition

of

"appurtenant"

generally

refer

to

appurtenances,

7

Quoting Deseret Livestock Company v. State, 171 P.2d 401 (Utah 1946),
and making reference to Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9 (1971).
8

See Brief of Petitioner at 17 where Amax states "Although neither the
plant nor the ponds are a mine or mining claim they can be centrally assessed
if they are "appurtenant" to a mine." This concession presupposes that Amax
is engaged in "mining/*
-13-

such

as

conveyed

water
for

rights

or

beneficial

easements,
use

of

the

that

n e c e s s a r i l y must be
9
lands.
These c a s e s are

i n a p p l i c a b l e because they decide whether incorporeal r i g h t s pass
as "appurtenances" to real property.

The i s s u e in t h i s

appeal,

however, i s whether taxable property, both r e a l and personal

(the

Amax p l a n t )

(the

i s an "appurtenance" to other t a n g i b l e property

Great S a l t Lake or "mine") which cannot be conveyed.

Almost

of the c a s e s Amax's c i t e s d e f i n e "appurtenance" on f a c t s

all

signifi-

c a n t l y d i s s i m i l a r to those of t h i s c a s e .
Third,

a

common sense

application

of

the

rules

of

s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n leads to the conclusion that Amaxfs p l a n t
should

be

Commission's

"deemed"
brief

appurtenant
explains,

to

the

the
term

mine.

As

"appurtenant"

the
can

Tax
have

m u l t i p l e meanings, including "adjunct," or "adjacent," which some
of

the

authorities

have accepted

as synonymous

with

"appurte-

nant," depending upon the context in which "appurtenant" i s used.

9

The cases discussing whether incorporeal property can pass as an appurtenance, upon which Amax r e l i e s , are cited in Brief of Respondent at 11.

*0
These rules, as set out in the Tax Commission's brief, are (1) the word
of the statute should be construed as a comprehensive whole and not piecemeal;
see Peay v, Board of Education of Provo City School D i s t r i c t , 377 P.2d 490
(Utah 1962); (2) the terms of the statute should be interpreted in accord with
usually accepted meanings; Utah County v. Orem City, 699 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985);
and (3) each term of the statute was used advisedly and therefore should-be
read l i t e r a l l y , unless a l i t e r a l meaning i s unreasonable, confusing or inoperable; see Home v. Home, 737 P.2d 244 (Utah App. 1987).
-14-

See

Brief of Respondent at 8.

In this context

"appurtenant"

should mean "adjunct" because "appurtenant" cannot mean "conveyed
for beneficial use of the lands."
Fourth, Balcar v. Lee County Cotton Oil Co., 193 S.W.
1094

(Tex.

Cir.

App.

1917),

upon

which

Amax

places

primary

reliance in arguing its definition of "appurtenant," is inapplicable to the extent

it defines "appurtenance" as that

"•

. .

which passes

incident

Id.

at

1095.

as an

to the principal

thing."

Instead, the case lends support to the Tax Commission to

the extent

it defines "appurtenance" as "[a] thing belonging to

another thing as principal . . . ," or "[a] thing used with, and
related to, or dependent upon another thing more worthy . . . ."
Id.

at

1095.

As

noted,

the

Amax

plant

cannot

pass

as

an

"appurtenance" to the "principal thing," the mine, or Great Salt
Lake,

because

"belongs

the

to" the

brine

lake

cannot

be

conveyed,

in the sense that

yet

the Amax

lake, ponds and plant - function as a unit.

the

plant

operation -

Amax stresses that

the plant could have been built at great distance from the lake,
Brief of Petitioner at 20, Tr. 35-37, but, in fact, the plant was
built next to the lake and in 1986 processed brine from the ponds
formed

from

possibility

lake waters.
that

the plant

Tr. 49, 137, 142.
could have
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The

functioned

theoretical

independently

from the lake should not overshadow the reality that in 1986 it
did not.
In summary, the Amax plant in 1986 should be deemed
"appurtenant" to the mine, and, accordingly, the plant should be
state-assessed, rather than county-assessed, property.
II.

THE TAX COMMISSION'S FAILURE TO EXTEND THE
20% DISCOUNT AVAILABLE TO COUNTY-ASSESSED
PROPERTY, UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. S 59-5-4.5
(Supp. 1986), TO AMAX'S REAL AND TANGIBLE
PROPERTY VIOLATES THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION
COMPONENTS
OF
ARTICLE XIII,
SECTION 3(1) AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 24 OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE DUE PROCESS AND
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

A.
The Tax Commission's Refusal to Apply Section
59-5-4.5 in Calculating the "Reasonable Fair Cash Value" of
Amax's Property Violates Article XIII, Section 3 of the Utah
Constitution.
Amax demonstrates in Point II B of its opening brief
and Point II of its Reply Brief that "the Commission's refusal to
apply

[section 59-5-4.5] to Amax's personal and real property

violates the express statutory language of section 59-5-4.5 as
well as the constitutional mandate of 'a uniform and equal rate
of assessment on all tangible property.1
§ 3(1)."

Utah Const, art. XIII,

Reply Brief of Petitioner at 14.

The issue, as Amax

frames it in section II of its brief, is whether a legislative
classification that gives some, but not all, taxpayers an immediate 20% deduction meets the standards of equality and uniformity
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mandated under Article XIIIf section 3(1) of the Utah Constitution.
Alqom

Even

though

this Court

v. San Juan County,

upheld

681 P.2d

section

184

59-5-4.5

in Rio

(Utah 1984) against a

challenge that the statute was "facially unconstitutional," 681
P.2d

at

187, Amax

explains

two

reasons why

Rio Alqom

is not

controlling.
First, the Rio Alqom plaintiffs adduced no evidence of
actual nonuniformity in tax assessments of state-assessed properties as compared with county-assessed properties.
Rio Alqom Court

In fact, the

repeatedly stressed that "the factual premises

that state valuation and county valuation were not uniform has
not been attacked."

Ld. at 193.

legislative prerogative

Accordingly,

it was

to remedy a conceded disparity

in the
by dis-

counting local assessments:
[T]he Legislature may seek to enforce the
uniformity requirements of [Article XIII]
S 3(1) by attempting to equalize the tax
burden by those taxpayers who pay a greater
tax in proportion to the value of their
property than others. In permitting transaction costs to be deducted from appraisals
based on comparable sales or cost appraisal
method, the Legislature has neither departed
from the "cash value" requirement of Article
XIII, S 3, nor gone beyond its constitutional
duty to "prescribe by law such regulations as
shall secure a just valuation for taxation."
Id. at 193-94.
Rio

Alqom,

the

Amax correctly points out, however, that unlike
Tax

Commission's

-17-

refusal

to

extend

the

20%

discount

to Amax's

property

does

not

equalize

the disparity

between state-assessed and county-assessed property, but instead
worsens the disparity.
sion used

The cost appraisal method the Tax Commis-

in valuing Amax's property

is the same method the

county would have used had Amax's property been county-assessed.
Tr. 152, 155-56, 202-203.

In this case, the distinction between

state-assessed and county-assessed property hinges upon a legal
point —

the definition of "appurtenant" —

which has no rela-

tionship to the property's fair market value.
Brief of Petitioner at 40 and 41.

Tr. 253.

See

Thus, the result of refusing

to extend the 20% discount in valuing Amax's property, if it is
state-assessed, is to widen the disparity between county-assessed
and state-assessed property for arbitrary reasons.
Second, Amax demonstrates in its reply brief that the
United States District Court's decision in Union Pacific Railroad,

et

al.,

v.

Utah

State

Tax

Commission,

et

al.. No.

C-82-0998J, slip op. (D. Utah Dec. 19, 1988) ("Union Pacific")
compounds the tax inequity, even assuming a valid distinction
between state-assessed and county-assessed property, by creating
a disparity between the railroads and the mining companies, both
of which are state-assessed properties.
In

Union

Pacific,

the

plaintiff

railroads,

Union

Pacific, the Denver & Rio Grande Western and Southern Pacific
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brought

consolidated

actions

in federal

court

against

the Tax

Commission, challenging their ad valorem property tax assessments
for 1984 and 1985.

The railroads successfully argued that the

assessments discriminated

against

them

in violation

of section

306 of the 4R Act, which makes it unlawful to assess railroad
transportation
value"

than

property

at a higher

the assessment

ratio to its "true market

ratio of

all other

commercial

and

industrial property compared to its "true market value" in the
same assessment jurisdiction.
supra.

See 49 U.S.C. S 11503(b)(1) quoted

In determining whether the Tax Commission's assessments

of the railroads discriminated against them, the court considered
the

effect

of

section

59-5-4.5

on

the

assessments

county-assessed commercial and industrial property.
that

reducing

does

not

property.

It concluded

county assessments by 20% under section

arrive

at

"true

market

value"

for

of

59-5-4.5

county-assessed

Union Pacific, slip op. at 57.
Union Pacific was decided after the parties filed their

principal briefs.

However, Amax argued in its Reply Brief:

The effect of the Union Pacific decision is
that, as of January 1, 1986, the tax lien
date for Amax's property in the present case,
the 20% discount of S 59-5-4.5 extended not
only to the class of locally assessed real
property, but also to all real and personal
property of railroads included within the
class of centrally assessed taxpayers. Thus,
irrespective of whether the Commission, or
this Court, agrees with the Union Pacific
-19-

c o u r t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 4R Act, the
e f f e c t of that d e c i s i o n in c r e a t i n g a new
c l a s s of
taxpayers within the c l a s s of
centrally
assessed
taxpayers
cannot
be
ignored.
Reply Brief of P e t i t i o n e r at 21.
The taxing d i s p a r i t y between c l a s s e s of
property owners that
Pacific
sections

violates
2 and 3,

the

state-assessed

"cannot be ignored" as a r e s u l t
"overarching

purpose"

of

of

Union

Article

XIII,

which the Rio Alqom Court declared was

achieve uniformity in the ad valorem taxing scheme."

"to

I d . at 194.

B.
The Tax Commission's Refusal to Apply S e c t i o n
5 9 - 5 - 4 . 5 in C a l c u l a t i n g the "Reasonable Fair Cash Value" of
Amax's Property V i o l a t e s the Due Process and Equal P r o t e c t i o n
Clauses of the Federal C o n s t i t u t i o n and the Due Procesjs and Equal
P r o t e c t i o n Components of A r t i c l e 1, S e c t i o n 24 of the Utah
Constitution.
Amax's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n

of

the taxing d i s p a r i t y

between

s t a t e - a s s e s s e d mines and r a i l r o a d s e f f e c t e d by Union P a c i f i c
important because i t r a i s e s a d d i t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l
discussed

in e i t h e r p a r t y ' s b r i e f .

11

Recent d e c i s i o n s

is

i s s u e s not
i s s u e d by

On May 10, 1989, the parties in Union Pacific stipulated to a dismissal
of cross appeals each had taken to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and on
May 11, 1989, the Tenth Circuit entered i t s order dismissing the appeals, a
copy of which order was attached to the motion of the Mining Association to
f i l e a brief as Amicus Curiae. As a result of the Tenth C i r c u i t s dismissal
of appeals taken from the d i s t r i c t court judgment, the Union Pacific decision
i s f i n a l . From 1985 onward, the railroads w i l l be entitled to a reduction in
value not available to other state-assessed property owners.
See Union
Pacific, s l i p op. at 57 and 58.
-20-

this

Court

and the

United S t a t e s

Supreme Court

subsequent

to

Union P a c i f i c and the f i l i n g of the p a r t i e s 1 b r i e f s make i t c l e a r
that

the

section

59-5-4.5

is

unconstitutional

not

only

under

A r t i c l e XIII, s e c t i o n 3 of the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , but a l s o under
the due process and equal p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e s of
Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution
12
s e c t i o n 24 of the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n . "

the
and

Fourteenth
Article

I,

This Court's most recent a n a l y s i s of an equal p r o t e c t i o n c h a l l e n g e to a s t a t e taxation scheme i s Blue Cross and Blue
S h i e l d v. S t a t e of Utah, No. 19676, s l i p op. (July 19, 1 9 8 9 ) .

In

Blue Cross, t h i s Court upheld the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of taxing the
premium

income

Blue Cross

nonprofit

and Blue S h i e l d ,

mutual b e n e f i t
argument

of

that

associations
"MBAs

are

health
while

service

corporations,

exempting premium

(MBAs") in the face of
in

12

all

significant

like

income of

Blue Cross 1
respects

Condemann v. University Hospital, 107 Utah Adv. Rptr. 5 (1989) i s
authority that this Court may review a party's constitutional claims under any
applicable constitutional provision, even though the party may have limited
i t s argument to only one of several possible constitutional i s s u e s .
Justice
Durham's lead opinion reviewed certain provisions of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. SS 63-30-1 to 38 (1986 and Supp. 1988) under an
equal protection and due process analysis, even though the due process issue
had not been raised. See Opinion of Justice Durham at Part II and Part I I I ;
the Opinion of Justice Zimmerman concurring in Part II (the "due process
alternative" section of Justice Durham's opinion) and the Opinion of Justice
Stewart suggesting that there was no reason to rely on a due process analysis,
since i t had not been raised, Id. a t 2 2 * Although Justice Stewart does not
rely on the due process analysis, he does not suggest that such a review i s
inappropriate.
-21-

indistinguishable
against

them."

classification

from
L3. at

exempts

other
9.

insurers

and

Recognizing

MBAs that

are

compete

that

adjuncts

the

directly

legislative

to

religious,

cooperative or benevolent o r g a n i z a t i o n s , as well as those " t h a t
are apparently
this

indistinguishable

Court nonetheless

Cross f a i l e d
burden."

Id.

from those taxed," _id. at 15,

upheld the taxing scheme because

"Blue

to show t h a t i t or any other insurer incurred any
at 16.

Consequently,

the " m i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n

of

i n s u r e r s r e s u l t i n g from the [taxing] measure is not s u f f i c i e n t

to

warrant s t r i k i n g down the t a x . "
The Court

further

Id.

concluded

that

its

analysis

under

A r t i c l e I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution was d i s p o s i t i v e of
the equal p r o t e c t i o n claim under the United S t a t e s

Constitution

since the Utah Constitution required j u s t i f i c a t i o n under a more
r i g o r o u s , although s i m i l a r , standard. 13

1J

J u s t i c e Zimmerman, speaking for the Court in Blue Cross and Blue Shield,
stated:
The p r i n c i p l e s and concepts embodied in the fede r a l equal protection clause and the s t a t e uniform
operation of the laws provision are s u b s t a n t i a l l y similar.
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 888 (Utah 1988); Malan v. Lewis,
693 P.2d 661,669-70 (Utah 1984). However, our examination i n t o the reasonableness of economic l e g i s l a t i o n
under a r t i c l e I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution
Footnote continued on next page.
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From

Blue

Cross

and

Blue

Shield,

it

follows

that

(1) taxing schemes that misclassify taxpayers and unfairly burden
some taxpayers (unlike the premium tax at issue in Blue Cross and
Blue Shield) may be unconstitutional; and (2) taxing schemes that
fail

equal

will

surely

protection
fail

analysis

the more

under

exacting

the

federal

standard

constitution

under Article

I,

section 24 of the Utah Constitution.
In

this

case,

section

59-5-4.5

is

unconstitutional

under the federal and state constitutions because its misapplication

unlawfully

and

adversely

impacts

property, as explained in Part III A.

state-assessed

mining

A similar taxation dispar-

ity was unanimously held unconstitutional under the federal equal
protection clause by the United States Supreme Court in Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commissioner of Webster County,
U.S.

, 102 L.Ed.2d 688 (1989).

Footnote continued from previous page.
is at least as vigorous as that required by the federal equal protection clause, and probably more so.
Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at 889, 890; see Recent
Developments, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 143, 317. Therefore,
if the statutes under attack can withstand scrutiny
under article I, section 24, they will not be found to
violate the federal equal protection clause.
Id. at 3.
-23-

The

facts of

Allegheny

are simple:

West

Virginia's

Webster County Tax Assessor valued Allegheny's property from 1975
to 1986 on the basis of a recent purchase price, while valuing
other

similarly

assessments.
tions

of

situated

properties

This resulted

properties

in

the

on

the

basis

of

previous

in gross disparities between valuasame

class.

In

its

analysis

of

Webster County's treatment of Allegheny Coal Company, the Court
acknowledged:
The use of a general adjustment as a transitional substitute for an individual reappraisal violates no constitutional command.
As long as general adjustments are accurate
enough over a short period of time to equalize the differences in proportion between the
assessments of a class of property holders,
the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied.
Id. at 697.
It also stated:
In each case, the constitutional requirement
is the seasonable attainment of a rough
equality and tax treatment of similarly
situated property owners.
Id. (emphasis added).
And that:
The States, of course, have broad latitude to
impose and collect taxes. A State may divide
different kinds of property into classes and
assign to each class a different tax burden
so long as those divisions and burdens are
reasonable.
Id.

(emphases added).
-24-

However, the Court concluded:
We have no doubt that petitioners have
suffered from such "intentional systematic
undervaluation by state officials" of comparable property in Webster County. Viewed in
isolation, the assessments for petitioners1
property may fully comply with West Virginia
law.
But the fairness of one's allocable
share of the total share of the property tax
burden can only be meaningfully evaluated by
a comparison with the share of others similarly situated relative to their property
holdings.
The relative undervaluation of
comparable property in Webster County over
time therefore denies petitioner the equal
protection of the law.
Id.

(emphasis added).
The holding in Allegheny should control the outcome of

this

appeal

substantially

because

the

similar.

salient

facts

of

the

two

cases

are

As in Allegheny, the disparity between

similarly situated property owners in this case will be perpetuated over time unless Amax's assessment overvaluation is declared
unconstitutional.
entitled

to

From

compare

1984

their

onward,
assessment

the

railroads

ratios

with

will

be

those

of

county-assessed commercial and industrial property before the 20%
reduction is applied to that property.

The Union Pacific court

explained:
Thus, if the court is to compare true market
value to true market value, it should compare
values before any adjustments for transaction
costs or other so-called intangibles are
made.

-25-

Id. at 56.
By

comparing

county-assessed

real

the

railroad's

property

before

true
the

market

value

20% discount

to

under

s e c t i o n 59-5-4.5 was applied, the court concluded the percentages
by which the r a i l r o a d s were overvalued ranged between 26% and 46%
for 1984 and 1985. 1 4
Since mines,
same

class

of

as s t a t e - a s s e s s e d

property

as

railroads,

property,
the

Tax

are

in

the

Commission's

overvaluation of the mines, as compared to r a i l r o a d s

and as a

r e s u l t of the r a i l r o a d ' s entitlement to the 20% reduction under
14

This point can be i l l u s t r a t e d by an equation•
Act i s :
Assessed value of
state-assessed r a i l
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n property
True market value of r a i l
t r a n s p o r t a t i o n property

must
=

The remedy under the 4R

Assessed value of Countyassessed commercial and
i n d u s t r i a l property
True Market Value of County
assessed commercial and
i n d u s t r i a l property

If the equation i s calculated before section 59-5-4.5 i s applied the r e s u l t
is:
1.00 = 1.00
1.00
1.00
There is no discrimination. But if the equation is calculated after section
59-5-4.5 is applied the result is:
1.00 t .80
1.00
1.00
The railroads, under the facts assumed above, would have been assessed 20% too
high.
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section 59-5-4.5, denies Amax and other mine owners equal protection of the law under the federal constitution.
For similar reasons, the Tax Commission's overvaluation
of Amax and other mine owners violates Article I, section 24 of
the Utah Constitution.

The test here, as explained by Justice

Zimmerman in Blue Cross and Blue Shield is "whether the classification is reasonable, whether the objectives are legitimate, and
whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification

and the

explained,

legislative purposes."

the classification

Ld. at

of state-assessed

3.

As already

railroads

with

county-assessed property under section 59-5-4.5, on the one hand,
and all other state-assessed properties, on the other, is unreasonable, and
section

frustrates the

59-5-4.5,

which

legislatures

was

to

narrow

objective
the

in passing

disparity

between

state-assessed and county-assessed property valuations.
A
under

state

similar
and

analysis

federal

and

due

identical

process

conclusion
15
guarantees.

follows
Justice

Durham's lead opinion in Condemarin stated:
Most recently, in Mountain Fuel Supply
Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884,
890 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted) we phrased
the test as follows:
15

Justice Durham's lead opinion in Condemarin commented that "Historically,
the overlap between equal protection and due process has been considerable."
Condemarin at 11. Consequently, if a classification violates equal protection, it likely violates due process as well.
-27-

"[The] [due process] test to be applied under
Article I, section 24 is whether the classification of those subject to the legislation
is a reasonable one and bears a reasonable
relationship to an achievement of the legitimate legislative purpose,"
The similarity
of
that
test
to a
means-end review under the doctrine of due
process is striking:
"If the laws passed are seen to have a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary or discriminatory, the requirements of due process
are satisfied . . . "
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502f 537 (1934);
see also Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74, 84-85 (1980).
Condemarin at 11.
Hence,
state-assessed
violates
Article

the

the

mines
equal

I, section

protection

and

due

overvaluation
as

compared

protection
24 of

to

and

of

Amax

state-assessed

due

process

the Utah Constitution

process

clauses

and

of

the

other

railroads

components
and

the

United

of

equal
States

Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Commission's Final Decision should be affirmed
in part and reversed in part.

The Court should affirm that part

of the Tax Commission's Final Decision which holds that Amax's
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plant is "appurtenant" to the mine, and is, thus, state-assessed,
not county-assessed, property.
The

Court

should

reverse

that

part

of

the

Tax

Commission's Final Decision holding that Amax is not entitled to
the 20% reduction set out in section 59-5-4.5 in calculating the
"reasonable fair cash value" of Amax's taxable property.
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ADDENDUM
1.

Utah Const, art. XIII, S 3(1).

2.

Utah Const, art. I, § 24.

3.

United States Const, amend. XIV.

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (1986).

5.

Utah Code Ann. S 59-5-4.5(1) (Supp. 1986).

6.

49 U.S.C. S 11503(b)(l)(1982).
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rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as
provided by law.
(2) The following are property tax exemptions:
(a) The property of the state, school districts,
and public libraries;
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all other political subdivisions
of the state, except that to the extent and in the
manner provided by the Legislature the property
of a county, city, town, special district or other
political subdivision of the state located outside
af its geographic boundaries as defined by law
may be subject to the ad valorem property tax;
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which
is used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes;
(d) Places of burial not held or used for private
er corporate benefit; and
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as
defined by statute. This exemption shall be implemented over a period of time as provided by
statute.
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on
January 1, m., which is held for sale or processing
and which is shipped to final destination outside this
state within twelve months may be deemed by law to
have acquired no situs in Utah for purposes of ad
valorem piuperty taxation and may be exempted by
law from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or produced or otherwise originating within or
without the state.
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on
January 1, m., held for side in the ordinary course of
hwinmiii and which constitutes the inventory of any
retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or
livestock raiser may be deemed for purposes of ad
valorem property taxation to be exempted.
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power
plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, pipes and
flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations
far irrigating land within the state owned by such
individuals or corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from taxation to the
extent that they shall be owned and used for such
purposes.
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and
ether property used for generating and delivering
oWUiiml power, a portion of which is used for furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes on lands in the state of Utah, may be exempted
from taxation to the extent that such property is used
far such purposes. These exemptions shall accrue to
the benefit of the users of water so pumped under
such regulations as the Legislature may prescribe.
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated
at such times and in such manner as may be provided
bylaw.
(8) The Legislature may provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of not to exceed 45% of the
fair market value of residential property as defined
by law; and all household furnishings, furniture, and
equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at
his place of abode in maintaining a home for himself
and family.
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served
in any war in the military service of the United
States or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried
widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons
or of persons who while serving in the military service of the United States or the state of Utah were
killed in action or died as a result of such service may
be exempted as the Legislature may provide.
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(10) Intangible property may be exempted from
taxation as property or it may be taxed as property in
such manner and to such extent as the Legislature
may provide, but if taxed as property the income
therefrom shall not also be taxed. Provided that if
intangible property is taxed as property the rate
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of
valuation.
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an
annual tax sufficient, with other sources of revenue,
to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the state
for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the
state debt, if any there be, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay the
annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt,
within twenty yearsfromthe final passage of the law
creating the debt.
iss7
Sec. 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible
property — Livestock — Land used for
agricultural purposes,)
(1) The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform
and equal rate of assessment on all tangible property
in the state, according to its value in money, except
as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The
Legislature shall prescribe by law such provisions as
shall secure a just valuation for taxation of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a
tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that the Legislature may determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock.
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the
Legislature prescribes, be sssessfri according to its
value for agricultural use without regard to the value
it may have for other purposes.
isss
S e c 4. [Mines and claims to be assessed — Basis and multiple — What to be assessed
aa tangible property.]
All metalliferous mines or mining claims, both
placer and rock in place, shall be assessed as the Legislature shall provide; but the basis and multiple now
used in determining the value of metalliferous mines
for taxation purposes and the additional assessed
value of 15.00 per acre thereof shall not be changed
before January 1, 1935, nor thereafter until otherwise provided -by-tew. All -other-mines -or mining
claims and other valuable mineral deposits, including
lands containing coal or hydrocarbons and all machinery used in mining and all property or surface
improvements upon or appurtenant to mines or mining claims, and the value of any surface use made of
mining claims, or mining property for other than
mining purposes, shall be assessed as other tangible
property.
isss
Sec. 5. (Local authorities to levy local taxes —
Sharing tax and revenues by political
subdivisions.)
Hie Legislature shall not impose taxes for the purpose of any county, city, town or other municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in the corporate authorities thereof, respectively, the power to assess
and collect taxes for all purposes of such corporation.
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in this Constitution, political subdivisions may share
their tax and other revenues with other political subdivisions as provided by statute.
isss
S e c 6. (Annual statement to be published.]
An accurate statement of the receipts and expenditures of the public moneys, shall be published annu-
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S e c 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for
public use without just compensation.
ISM
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any
franchise, privilege or immunity.
ISM
S e c 24. [Uniform operation of laws.)
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation
isss
Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed
to impair or deny others retained by the people
isss
S e c 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.
isss
S e c 27. [Fundamental rights.]
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is
essential to the security of individual rights and the
perpetuity offreegovernment.
isss
ARTICLE H
STATE BOUNDARIES
Section
1. [State boundaries.]
Section 1. [State boundaries.]
The boundaries of the State of Utah shall be as
follows
Beginning at a point formed by the intersection of
the thirty-second degree of longitude west from
Washington, with the thirty-seventh degree of north
latitude, thence due west along said thirty-seventh
degree of north latitude to the intersection of the
same with the thirty-seventh degree of longitude
west from Washington, thence due north along said
thirty-seventh degree of west longitude to the intersection of the same with the forty-second degree of
north latitude, thence due east along said forty-second degree of north latitude to the intersection of the
same with the thirty-fourth degree of longitude west
from Washington; thence due south along said thirtyfourth degree of west longitude to the intersection of
the same with the forty-first degree of north latitude,
thence due east along said forty-first degree of north
latitude to the intersection of the same with the
thirty-second degree of longitude west from Washington; thence due south along said thirty-second degree
of west longitude to the place of beginning.
isss
ARTICLE III
ORDINANCE
[Ordinance.]
[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.]
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation of
lands — Exemption.]
[Territorial debts assumed.]
[Free nonsectanan schools.]
[Ordinance.]
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people of
this State:
isss

Art IV, § 2

[Religious toleration — Polygamy forbidden.]
First: — Perfect toleration of religious sentiment is
guaranteed. No inhabitant of this State shall ever be
molested in person or property on account of his or
her mode of religious worship; but polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited.
isss
[Right to public domain disclaimed — Taxation
of lands — Exemption.)
Second — The people inhabiting this State do affirm and declare that they forever disclaim all right
and title to the unappropriated public lands lying
within the boundaries hereof, and to all lands lying
within said limits owned or held by any Indian or
Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall
have been extinguished by the United States, the
same shall be and remain subject to the disposition of
the United States, and said Indian landls shall remain
under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the
Congress of the United States. The lands belonging to
citizens of the United States, residing without this
State shall never be taxed at a higher rate than the
lands belonging to residents of this State, but nothing
in this ordinance shall preclude this state from taxing, as other lands are taxed, any lands owned or held
by any Indian who has severed his tribal relations,
and has obtained from the United States or from any
person, by patent or other grant, a title thereto, save
and except such lands as have been or may be
granted to any Indian or Indians under any act of
Congress, containing a provision exempting the lands
thus granted from taxation, which last mentioned
lands shall be exempt from taxation so long, and to
such extent, as is or may be provided in the act of
Congress granting the same.
i«7
[Territorial debts assumed.]
Third: — All debts and liabilities of the Territory of
Utah, incurred by authority of the Legislative Assembly thereof, are hereby assumed and shall be paid by
this State
isss
[Free nonsectarian schools.]
Fourth — The Legislature shall make laws for the
establishment and maintenance of a system of public
schools, which shall be open to all the children of the
State and befreefromsectarian control
isss
ARTICLE IV
ELECTIONS AND
RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE
Section
1 [Equal political rights]
2 [Qualifications to vote ]
3 [Voters — Immunity from arrest ]
4 (Voters — Immunity from militia duty ]
5 [Voters to be citizens of United States ]
6 (Mentally incompetent persons and certain ci mnals ineligible to vote.)
7 [Property qualification forbidden.]
8. (Ballot to be secret ]
9 [Elections, when held — Terms, when begin.]
10. [Oath of office ]
Section 1. [Equal political rights.]
The rights of citizens of the State of Utah to vote
and hold office shall not be denied or abridged on
account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this
State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and privileges
isss
Sec. 2. [Qualifications to vote.]
Every citizen of the United States, eighteen years

on the list of those voted for as President, the House
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President But in choosing the President, the
votes shall be taken by states, the representation
from each state having one vote; a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a member or members from
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House
of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
Vice-President shall set as President, as in the case of
taw death or other constitutional disability of the
President.—The person having the greatest number
ef votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a
majority, then from the two highest numbers on the
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no
person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the
United States.
AMENDMENT X m
8ection
1. [Slavery prohibited.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment]
•action 1.
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
aa a punishment for crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
See. 2. [Power to enforce amendment]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be
paid.]
5. (Power to enforce amendment]
Section 1. (Citixenship — Doe process of law —
Equal protection.]
All persons born or naturalised in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citisens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law, nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
S a c 2. [Repreeentativee — Power to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whoie number of persons in each State,
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to
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vote at any electionforthe choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and dtisens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in
the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
S e c 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in
Congress, or Elector of President and Vice President,
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United
States, or under any State, who, having previously
taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an
officer of the United States, or as a member of any
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer
of any State, to support the Constitution of the
United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or
rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to
the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of
two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
8 e c 4. [Public debt not to be queetioned —
Debts of the Confederacy and claims
not to be paidJ
The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment cf pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State
shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of
any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims
shall be held illegal and void.
S e c 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
AMENDMENT XV
Section
1. [Right of citixens to vote — Race or color not to
disqualify.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Right of dtisens to vote — Race or
color not to diequaiify.]
The right of citixens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.
S e c 2. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XVI
[Income tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect
taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived,
without apportionment among the several States,
and without regard to any census or enumeration.

The full text of Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-3 (1986) [now
codified at Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201 (1988)] provides:
Pipelines,
power
lines
and
plants, canals and
irrigation works, bridges and ferries, and the property of
car and transportation companies, when they are operated as
a unit in more than one county/ all property of public
utilities whether operated within one county or more, all
mines and mining claims, and the value of metalliferous
mines based on ten times the annual net proceeds thereof as
provided in Section 59-5-57, and all other mines and mining
claims and other valuable deposits, including lands
containing coal or hydrocarbons, nonmetalliferous minerals
underlying land the surface of which is owned by a person
other than the owner of such minerals, all machinery used in
mining and all property or surface improvements upon or
appurtenant to mines or mining claims and the value of any
surface use made of nonmetalliferous mining claims or mining
property for other than mining purposes? must be assessed by
the State Tax Commission as hereinafter provided; except
that property assessed by the unitary method, not necessary
to the conduct and which does not contribute to the income
of the business shall be assessed separately. On January 1,
1986, all methods of assessment used by the State Tax
Commission not in statue shall be changed so as to increase
assessment values by a factor of five. All taxable property
not required by the Constitution or by law to be assessed by
the State Tax Commission must be assessed by the county
assessor of the several counties in which the same is
situated. For the purposes of taxation all mills, reduction
works, and smelters used exclusively for the purpose of
reducing or smelting the ores from a mine or mining claim by
the owner thereof shall be deemed to be appurtenant to such
mine or mining claim though the same is not upon such mine
or mining claim.
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-4.5(1) (Supp. 1986) stated:
When the county assets]or uses the comparable sales or cost
appraisal method in valuing taxable property for assessment
purposes, the assessor is required to recognize that various
fees, services, closing costs, and other expenses related to
the transaction lessen the acutal amount that may be
received in the transaction.
The county assessor shall,
therefore, take 80% of the value based on comparable sales
or cost appraisal of the property as its reasonable fair
cash value for purposes of assessment.
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§ 11503* Tax discrimination against rail transportation property
(a) In this section—
(1) "assessment" means valuation for a property tax levied by
a taxing district.
(2) "assessment jurisdiction" means a geographical area in a
State used in determining the assessed value of property for ad
valorem taxation.
(3) "rail transportation property" means property, as defined
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, owned or used by a
rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction
of the Commission under subchapter I of chapter 105 of this
title.
(4) "commercial and industrial property" means property,
other than transportation property and land used primarily for
agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to a commercial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy.
(b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate
against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or
authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any
of them:
(1) assess rail transportation property at a value that has a
higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation
property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial
and industrial property.
(2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be
made under clause (1) of this subsection.
(3) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate
applicable to commercial and industrial property in the same
assessment jurisdiction.
(4) impose another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing transportation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission under subchapter I of chapter 105 of this title.
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